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The global burden of disorders has shifted from infectious disease to non-communi-
cable diseases, including neuropsychiatric disorders. Whereas infectious disease can 
sometimes be combated by targeting single causal mechanisms, such as prevention 
of contact-spread illness by handwashing, in the case of mental disorders multiple 
causal mechanisms are typically relevant. The emergent field of global mental health 
has emphasized the magnitude of the treatment gap, particularly in the low- and 
middle-income world and has paid particular attention to upstream causal factors, for 
example, poverty, inequality, and gender discrimination in the pathogenesis of mental 
disorders. However, this field has also been criticized for relying erroneously on Western 
paradigms of mental illness, which may not be relevant or appropriate to the low- and 
middle-income context. Here, it is important to steer a path between scientism and 
skepticism. Scientism regards mental disorders as essential categories, and takes a 
covering law approach to causality; skepticism regards mental disorders as merely social 
constructions and emphasizes the role of political power in causal relations. We propose 
an integrative model that emphasizes the contribution of a broad range of causal mecha-
nisms operating at biological and societal levels to mental disorders and the consequent 
importance of broad spectrum and multipronged approaches to intervention.
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inTRODUCTiOn
In recent decades, there has been a shift from infectious disease to non-communicable diseases 
throughout the world. Mental, neurological, and substance use disorders are already the largest 
contributor to the burden of disease; these prevalent, chronic, and costly disorders now account 
for 22% of disablilty adjusted life years (DALYs) from all medical causes in those aged 15–49 (1). 
Furthermore, forecasts indicate that in the foreseeable future they will become even more central to 
global public health, with the World Economic Forum predicting that neuropsychiatric disorders 
will comprise the largest costs of chronic, non-communicable diseases globally in the next two 
decades (2).
Increased recognition of the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders has given impetus to the 
emergence of the discipline of global mental health (3). Additional key considerations are that inter-
ventions for mental disorders impact positively on individual well-being and country development 
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and are highly cost-efficient, but that neuropsychiatric disorders 
are often underdiagnosed and undertreated, with the treatment 
gap particularly large in low- and middle-income countries. 
Furthermore, this treatment gap is a human rights issue; levels of 
stigmatization of people living with mental illness are too high, 
and levels of mental health literacy are too low in communities, 
clinicians, and policy makers (4, 5).
Clinical and research work on neuropsychiatric disorders 
raises a number of conceptual and ethical questions, many of 
which are relevant to the field of global mental health (6). In 
considering some of these conceptual and ethical questions, we 
have argued that clinicians and researchers should steer a course 
between a scientism that regards mental disorders as natural 
kinds, and a skepticism that views all mental disorders as mere 
sociocultural constructions (7–9). Integrative approaches are 
needed to address fully the complex reality of mental disorders. In 
this commentary, we discuss this view in relation to global mental 
health, considering in turn issues of diagnosis, pathogenesis, and 
intervention (Table 1).
GLOBAL MenTAL HeALTH AnD 
DiAGnOSiS
Global mental health has emphasized that mental disorders are 
prevalent and associated with significant suffering, impairment, 
and socioeconomic costs. Thus, for example, data from the World 
Mental Health Surveys have emphasized that mental disorders are 
more impairing than physical disorders, but are less likely to be diag-
nosed and treated (10). While such conclusions are pertinent around 
the globe, in low- and middle-income countries, a lack of resources 
is particularly likely to exacerbate the treatment gap. These sorts of 
data provide an important foundation for the rallying cry of global 
mental health that there is no health without mental health (11).
Nevertheless, global mental health has also come under fire 
for its emphasis on these sorts of data. In particular, critics have 
argued that the field relies erroneously on Western paradigms of 
mental illness, which may not be relevant or appropriate to the 
low- and middle-income context (12). Such constructs run the 
TABLe 1 | Moving beyond scientism and skepticism in global mental health: integrative approaches to diagnosis, pathogenesis, and intervention.
Scientism Skepticism integrative
Diagnosis Diagnostic systems rely on 
essentialist categories or natural 
kinds. Assessment systems will be 
ultimately be supported by data on 
endophenotypes
Mental illness is expressed and experienced 
differently in different sociocultural contexts. 
Symptoms vary from time to time and place to 
place
Mental illness is a complex reality. 
Nosologies are theory bound and value 
laden, but may improve as the relevant 
science and debate advance
Pathogenesis May approach causality in terms of 
covering laws. May focus on a single 
set of associations, such as those 
which characterize the health care 
system
May emphasize the role of sociocultural values 
and powers in explanations. May focus on 
differences in conceptualization of disorders 
across history and geography
Emphasizes that a broad range of 
factors are involved in the pathogenesis 
of mental disorders, with causal 
mechanisms operating at multiple 
interacting levels
Intervention May take a single-bullet approach, 
looking for focused interventions, 
whether biological or community 
focused that will target the essence of 
the disorder
May emphasize that interventions reflect 
local values and powers. Both biological and 
community-focused interventions reinforce 
existing societal structures
Incorporates a range of insights about 
the nature of mental disorders, and 
targets a broad range of factors involved 
in their pathogenesis, including biological 
and social ones
risk of ignoring how symptoms vary from time to time and from 
place to place, and of downplaying the complex ways in which 
illnesses are expressed and experienced differently in different 
sociocultural contexts (13). Indeed, Jacob and Patel have empha-
sized that global mental health needs new diagnostic approaches, 
a view that is perhaps partially consistent with attempts in 
clinical neuroscience to reformulate approaches to evaluation of 
neuropsychiatric disorders (14, 15).
At the same time, international classification systems have 
significant clinical advantages, and there are currently no viable 
alternatives in practice. We would, therefore, argue that although 
it is clearly important to recognize the limitations of current psy-
chiatry nosology and biopsychosocial models (16, 17), we ought 
to be wary of unrealistic expectations of such approaches (18). For 
example, medicine does not require that its diagnostic systems are 
essentialist in nature; rather medical syndromes provide clinicians 
with a practical set of tools for assessing patients. Rather than 
insisting that assessment systems will ultimately be supported 
solely by data on endophenotypes – intermediate phenotypes with 
high heritability – we can also ask that more work is also needed 
on exophenotypes, such as societal, structural, and other upstream 
contributors to disease and illness (19), and their intersections.
GLOBAL MenTAL HeALTH AnD 
PATHOGeneSiS
Although infectious diseases may involve a range of biological 
and psychosocial factors, it is sometimes possible to combat these 
conditions by targeting single causal mechanisms. Locating the 
geographic source of a cholera epidemic, employing handwash-
ing to decrease bacterial transmission, developing vaccines to 
prevent polio and smallpox, and using mosquito nets to prevent 
malaria have been seminal exemplars of success for public health. 
In contrast, global mental health has had to contend with multiple 
upstream factors that impact mental disorders: poverty, inequal-
ity, gender discrimination, and more.
At the same time, any emphasis of global mental health on 
only one set of causal factors can potentially be problematic. 
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Some research priority setting exercises have indicated that global 
mental health should focus primarily on health systems research, 
for example, and should pay less attention to the biological causes 
of mental disorders (20). This is consistent with a criticism of 
global mental health which emphasizes that it is ironic that a field 
that purports to be concerned with a broad range of socioeco-
nomic factors relies on neuroessentialist DSM-5 categories. After 
all, key considerations for Western-based typologies of illness 
are that they have diagnostic validity, that disorders demonstrate 
high heritability, or that they predict response to interventions 
such as pharmacotherapy.
Our own view is that there are important opportunities at the 
intersection of global mental health and clinical neuroscience 
in addressing the pathogenesis of mental disorders (21). There 
has been significant progress on understanding how nature and 
nurture intersect to create vulnerabilities for mental disorder, 
and indeed in recognizing how multiple levels of causal factors 
contribute to these conditions (7, 22). We have previously noted, 
for example, that while basic neuroscience has shed a great deal 
of insight into addiction, a full understanding of substance 
use disorders requires the psychological and social levels to be 
included (8, 9). Only a comprehensive and integrative perspec-
tive will allow an understanding of complex phenomena, such as 
decreased voluntary control in addictive disorders (23).
GLOBAL MenTAL HeALTH AnD 
inTeRvenTiOn
Global mental health has focused on task shifting and imple-
mentation science. This is certainly important in the context of 
resource-limited settings, where there are simply not enough 
trained professionals to deliver interventions, where health 
systems have systemic problems, and where there is growing 
evidence that non-specialized community workers can make a 
real impact (3). Indeed, some of the concerns of global mental 
health mirror those of the solution-oriented bent of neuroethics; 
there is a focus on efforts to improve wellness, on the importance 
of human rights, and on an empirical approach to optimizing 
interventions (6).
At the same time, there are potential criticisms of the focus 
of global mental health on communities, task shifting, and 
implementation science. Sartorius and colleagues, for example, 
have noted that in many parts of the globe, communities have 
changed in significant ways and are no longer able to provide the 
support that those with serious mental illness need and deserve 
(24). Furthermore, some tasks simply cannot be shifted, and 
we need to focus at times rather on novel biological treatments 
(25) or on increasing resources; it is crucial that in attempt-
ing to strengthen resource-limited systems, we do not simply 
institutionalize mechanisms that can only work in impoverished 
systems.
Again, we would argue for an integrative approach. It is 
important to avoid a scientism which states that given that 
mental disorders are natural kinds, they will ultimately succumb 
to single-bullet biological interventions (26). At the same time, 
we do not want to fall to prey to a skepticism that indicates that 
interventions should be entirely focused on changing the way 
in which disorders are conceptualized and labeled by society, or 
that they should be limited to community practices. We need an 
integrative approach to intervention that incorporates a range of 
insights about the nature of mental disorders and that targets a 
broad range of factors involved in their pathogenesis, including 
psychobiological factors and community processes.
COnCLUSiOn
We have argued elsewhere that it is important to avoid neurore-
ductionism and to emphasize instead that mental and substance 
use disorders require an understanding of psychosocial factors. 
Put differently, it is important to steer a path between scientism, 
which regards mental disorders as essential categories and takes a 
covering law approach to causality, and skepticism, which regards 
mental disorders merely as social constructions and reduces cau-
sality to considerations of political power. Here, we have applied 
these arguments to the newly emergent field of global mental 
health, considering issues relevant to diagnosis, pathogenesis, and 
treatment (Table 1), and emphasizing that a broad range of causal 
mechanisms operating at biological, psychological, and societal 
levels, and at the interactions between these levels, contribute 
to mental disorders, and that clinical interventions and research 
practices must match this complexity.
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